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CHILDREN’S BODIES: THE BATTLEGROUND FOR THEIR RIGHTS? 
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The UNCRC has changed profoundly ideas about adult/child relationships and there is now 
an acknowledgment in both law and policy that children have a right to be consulted and to 
participate in decisions made about their lives. This has been widely discussed and critiqued 
and one of the most significant battlegrounds for debate has been children’s rights to 
consent or refuse medical treatment and the issue of exactly who has the right to control 
children’s bodies. This article will compare several cases where the English and Scottish 
courts have made various decisions and rulings about the extent to which children do have 
rights to control their bodies. It will question why, twenty years after the UK ratified the 
UNCRC, children are still considered incompetent in matters concerning their own bodies, 
unless proved otherwise, while adults are automatically considered competent unless shown 
not to be and will analyse whether this situation is compatible with a children’s rights 
agenda.  
 
Keywords: Children’s rights over their bodies; participation; reproductive and sexual health; 
anorexia; UNCRC 
 
Introduction 
 
While there have been criticisms of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), it is indisputable that it has profoundly changed ideas about adult/child 
relationships and about the nature of childhood itself, not least through the 
acknowledgment in both law and policy that children have a right to be consulted and to 
participate in decisions made about their lives. Yet this right remains contested and this 
article will examine one particular area – the right of children to control their own bodies – 
where implementing this right has caused problems. It will argue that there is still profound 
unease over children’s participation in health care decisions and that law and practice are 
contradictory and ambivalent. It will compare several cases where this right has been 
debated in the English courts and the various rulings made. In particular it will examine the 
decisions made about children’s rights to control their sexuality and reproduction with 
those which have sought to impose unwanted medical treatment or intervention, through 
force-feeding children suffering from anorexia. While all these cases focus on children’s 
rights to consent to, or refuse treatment, the courts tend to come to very different 
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judgments, suggesting that children’s rights over their bodies remain unresolved. This article 
will question why, twenty years after the UK ratified the UNCRC, children are still considered 
incompetent in matters concerning their own bodies, unless proved otherwise, while adults 
are automatically considered competent unless shown not to be. It will end by analysing 
whether this situation is compatible with a children’s rights agenda.  
 
 
The battleground of the body 
 
The UNCRC introduced an ideology of childhood based on respect for children’s dignity and 
shifted the emphasis when intervening in children’s lives ‘from protection to autonomy, 
from nurturance to self-determination, from welfare to justice’ (Freeman 1992: 3). Twenty 
years later however Childhood Studies scholars have suggested that in the UK this ideal has 
not filtered down into general discourse and that rather than  being empowered and justly 
treated, children  are perceived as being at risk as never before and that the institutions of 
the state, as well as their own parents, are failing them. Furthermore, there is a sense that 
childhood is in crisis – children are out of control, unhappy and a risk to themselves and 
others (Kehily 2010). Furedi (2001) locates the trouble spots of contemporary childhood 
within the family, arguing that the rise of ‘experts’ in parenting and child rearing has 
undermined parents’ confidence and lead to a pervasive paranoia about childhood being 
under threat and out of control. The UNICEF well-being tables which regularly put British 
children near the bottom in terms of happiness and well being (Adamson et al 2007), the 
surveys by Barnardo’s which suggest that 49% of people believe that children are beginning 
to behave like animals and are a danger to each other and adults (Barnardo’s 2011) and the 
work by some authors which argues that children are put under too much pressure at 
school and are being made unhappy by the social expectations placed on them (Palmer 
2006), all point to the idea that despite the legal protections and the new emphasis on 
children’s rights in local authority, educational and health settings, children are now 
fundamentally worse off than they were in the past. As England’s Children’s Commissioner 
wrote in the forward to his office’s Five Year Plan, ‘There is a crisis at the heart of our 
society’ and this crisis is focused on childhood (Aynlsey-Green 2007: 12). In short, not only 
are individual children stressed, miserable and threatening to themselves and others but 
childhood itself is under attack, increasingly commercialized and pressurized. 
 
This is not a homogenous view of course. It can be argued that adults have always viewed 
childhood as being in a permanent state of crisis and that there is always a tendency to look 
back on childhoods in the past as better, more free and happier (Brockliss and Montgomery, 
2010). Morrow and Mayall (2009) have questioned the basis on which the UNICEF well-
being tables are compiled and argued that the basis of the questioning may well be flawed 
and similar criticism can be levelled at the Barnardo’s survey. It would be too sweeping a 
generalisation to claim that childhood is in crisis and much worse than ever, but 
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nevertheless there is a powerful discourse in the media, among politicians, and within 
Childhood Studies circles that there is an acute problem with today’s children in the 
industrialised West. Furthermore the certainty with which the idealised Western childhood, 
as modelled in the UNCRC, was once held up as a template for the rest of the world to 
follow is diminishing. It is coming under attack not only from academics but from parents in 
the global South who reject what they perceive as the imposition of alien models of 
childhood. As parents in Ghana told one researcher looking at ideas about children’s rights - 
‘We don’t want Western children in Ghana’ (Twum-Danso 2009).  
 
Within the UK, many of the fears around childhood revolve around children’s bodies and 
their rights over them. According to Furedi and others, there is an obsessive concern with 
child safety, from paranoia over child abductions to parents who drive behind the school 
coach to ensure their children arrive safely at their destination. More recently the fears of 
early sexualisation have resulted in two government enquiries within 18 months,1 both of 
which have looked at, among other issues, appropriate clothing for children and dealt with 
similar concerns about what rights children have over their own bodies and whether or not 
it is always parents who have the ultimate say in controlling what happens to them. While 
these concerns of sexualisation and safety are increasingly debated in the media, other 
issues, especially around consent to medical treatment, have been dealt with by the courts 
and the rest of this article will look at how these have played out and what impact the 
UNCRC has had on these decisions. 
 
Some of the highest profile cases of the last thirty years have focused on the precise issue of 
who can consent to treatment, and what is in children’s best interests; issues central to both 
the Gillick and Axon rulings discussed below. It is perhaps not surprising that these issues 
have become so prominent in law – the right to control one’s own body is fundamental to 
many civil and social rights agendas. Many of the great battles fought by second-wave 
feminists focused on women’s rights over their own bodies, particularly on their sexuality 
and on their reproductive rights (Whelehan 1995). ‘My body, my choice’ became, and 
remains, a powerful rallying cry still heard in contemporary debates over abortion and rape. 
Children’s rights, however, has never contained such a manifesto even though many current 
debates over the role and status of children in society focus on exactly the same issues.  
 
Childhood Studies, heavily influenced as it is by the UNCRC, has always placed a great 
emphasis on children’s own understandings of their bodies, their illnesses and on their right 
to refuse or consent to medical treatment (Christiansen 2000).  In one of the first studies 
carried out on children’s own views and understandings of life-shortening illnesses, Myra 
Bluebond-Langer (1978) showed very clearly how important it was to children to retain 
some sense of control over what was going on. Her child informants understood very clearly 
                                                          
1 Sexualisation of Youth People Review and Bailey Review of the Commercialisation and Sexualisation of 
Childhood, 2011. 
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that they were dying, even though their parents and doctors had specifically kept the 
information from them.  By looking at the condition of other children and noting the 
gestures and attitudes of the people caring for them, the children understood that their 
illnesses were terminal but tended to shield their parents from this knowledge.  While 
children were not always able directly to refuse treatment or make decisions about the 
remainder of their lives, Bluebond-Langner argued that children were not just the passive 
recipients of the information that their carers wanted them to have. 
 
Since this groundbreaking study, children’s rights to consent or not in certain aspects of 
their medical treatment have slowly gained ground and have been much discussed in courts 
and in medical ethics (Miller 2003). From an academic perspective, there is a general 
presupposition in favour of the view that children can consent and do have the right to 
refuse treatment. At the far end of the spectrum are those who view all children, whatever 
their age, as being able to express themselves and able to participate meaningfully in 
medical treatment. The work of Priscilla Alderson and her colleagues (2005), which looked 
at premature babies in neo-natal units, claimed that even at this early stage they showed 
preferences for particular nurses and could communicate their pain and suffering 
effectively. Some babies, both parents and doctors sometimes believed, decided whether to 
continue struggling for life or not. Alderson et al argued passionately that for children’s 
rights to be meaningful, even these small babies should be seen as citizens with rights to 
participation and whose wishes, however they were expressed, should be at least 
acknowledged in their treatment. 
 
In other cases even those who work for and support children’s rights do not see the right to 
consent as absolute. In Norway in 2001, for example, the then Ombudsman pushed for a 
legal ban on cosmetic surgery for those under 18, despite protests from girls of 16 who felt 
fully competent to make decisions about such treatment. The Ombudsman said in an 
interview: 
 
There was some resistance among girls from sixteen to eighteen when we 
proposed to higher the age of cosmetic surgery from sixteen to eighteen, and 
the resistance was about you do not trust us, you don’t trust our competence 
to make a decision about our own lives. And I had to tell them back no, I did 
not because this industry has an enormous power, and it is defining what is 
how your body should look like.  
(quoted in Montgomery, 2003: 216) 
 
Heather Montgomery and Marc Cornock: Children’s Bodies 
23 
 
The same children would have the right to consent to sex, be prescribed contraception and 
also would be able to access abortion on demand but were not deemed competent to 
decide on cosmetic surgery.2 
 
 
UNCRC and rights over the body 
 
At first glance it may sound odd to suggest that the UNCRC is silent on the subject of 
children’s bodies – the UNCRC explicitly sets out children’s right to bodily freedom in the 
form of freedom from ‘torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ (Article 37) and promotes children’s rights to health and access to health care 
(Articles 6, 17, 23 and 24, among others). Article 12 deals with children’s rights to have their 
views taken into consideration while Article 14 acknowledges that children’s capacities for 
expressing these views evolve throughout childhood and states that the law must take 
account of these in matters of conscience and freedom of thought. Taken together these 
Articles suggest a pragmatic approach which assumes that children should be consulted 
about what happens to them and that they do have rights to bodily autonomy and the 
freedom to make choices about what happens to their bodies. The UNCRC is, however, 
silent on the extent of these rights and whether children have the right to make these 
choices independently, whether parents, guardians, children’s commissioners or doctors 
should overrule them when necessary to ensure other rights and where the balance 
between protection and participation lies. While the principle of the ‘best interest of the 
child’ remains paramount, who has the ultimate right to decide this is left open. 
 
This is not meant as a criticism of the UNCRC. While it has been thoroughly critiqued by 
many throughout its existence for its ethnocentrism and impracticality, it is important to 
remember that it was never written as a step by step blueprint of action and many of the 
details about practical implementation have been written into national country laws after its 
ratification (the next section will look at this in relation to England, Wales and Scotland in 
more detail). Indeed in many countries, it is unfortunately true that children’s rights to 
consent and retain control over their bodies are much less important than the fact that 
healthcare is non-existent, food is scarce and participation rights worth little in contexts 
where mortality rates remain high and neither children nor adults have basic ontological 
security. Nevertheless, the rights enshrined in the UNCRC are indivisible and universal and 
the issue of consent and the underlying philosophy behind who is competent and who is not 
is central to contemporary studies of childhood, not least because within such discussions 
we can see how ideas about childhood are worked through in practice. By focusing on cases 
from the UK it becomes clear that, in this context at least, there is a large gap between the 
                                                          
2 In Norway all women over 16 have the right to an abortion up to the 12th week of pregnancy, if they are 
under 16 parents must be informed (Løkeland 2004). 
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rhetoric of children’s rights and their implementation and that the idea of children as active 
participants in their own decisions is still a long way from reality. 
 
 
Position in English law 
 
If the law of England and Wales provides for children to exercise control over their own 
bodies, it would be expected that this would be expressed in either statute or case law.  
Looking at these however does not provide definitive answers. The Children Act 1989 
provides that anyone under the age of eighteen is a child (section 105) and, as such, has 
limited rights compared to an adult.  At the age of eighteen the right to full autonomy is 
achieved and, by virtue of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the presumption is in favour of 
competence with the onus on proving lack of competence on those who suggest that 
competence is lacking. One of these limited rights that children have is the right to consent 
over their own body. Section 8(3) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 provides that those 
over the age of sixteen be treated as if they had attained the age of eighteen with regard to 
their right to consent over matters concerning their own bodies.  It is worth noting that this 
right to consent is exactly as it says: a right to consent.  The provision within Section 8 of the 
Family Law Reform Act 1969 makes no mention of the individual’s right to refuse or 
withhold consent.  Indeed if an individual over the age of sixteen but under eighteen 
refused to consent for a medical procedure, their refusal can be legally overridden by 
someone with parental responsibility, or by the courts, acting in the individual’s best 
interest. 
 
Thus English law does allow those who have attained the age of sixteen a degree of control 
over their own bodies, but only where this is in accepting a treatment that is being offered 
to them.  Where they wish to refuse a particular treatment English law does not offer them 
automatic protection as their refusal can be legally set aside. The provision within the 
Family Law Reform Act 1969 is a positive step, and should be seen as such. It means that 
where a sixteen or seventeen year old has provided their consent, there is no legal need to 
also obtain consent from someone with parental responsibility, allowing the individual the 
right to be autonomous in this regard and not have their decisions subject to approval from 
a parent or guardian. However, the provision within Section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 
1969 does not go far enough to be said to meet Article 12 of the UNCRC and allow those 
who have attained the age of sixteen to be fully autonomous or fully participate in decisions 
made about their bodies, as any refusal by them is subject to the possibility of being 
overridden.   
 
There is no such statutory provision or protection for those under sixteen. For this group of 
individuals, it is case law that has provided legal authority for them to exercise some degree 
of control over their own bodies. It is no exaggeration to say that the Gillick case (Gillick v. 
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West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112) is a landmark case in this 
regard. It is this case that provides the legal basis for children under the age of sixteen to 
provide a valid consent to medical procedures affecting their bodies.  
 
The Gillick case was concerned with whether a circular issued to Health Authorities by the 
Department of Health and Social Security was lawful, when it advised that a doctor at a 
Family Planning Clinic could prescribe contraceptives to a girl under the age of sixteen, 
provided that he was doing so in order to protect the girl from the harmful effects of sexual 
intercourse.  In deciding the case, the courts considered the nature of parental rights over a 
child and the rights of a child in making decisions about their bodies. With regard to 
parental rights, the House of Lords were of the view that as a child developed their 
independence increased and parental control relaxed. Further, that there was no absolute 
rule that parents had authority over their children until a fixed age. Lord Fraser stated that 
‘parental rights to control a child do not exist for the benefit of the parent. They exist for the 
benefit of the child and they are justified only in so far as they enable the parent to perform 
his duties towards the child’ (at page 170), with Lord Scarman noting that ‘parental rights 
are derived from parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection 
of the person and property of the child’ (at page 184).  Lord Fraser also indicated that he 
agreed with the words of Lord Denning in Hewer v Bryant [1969] 3 All ER 578, when he 
stated that ‘even up till a young person’s 18th birthday, the parental right is a dwindling right 
which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child and the more so the 
older he is’ (at page 582). Thus it is clear that parental rights are not absolute and that as a 
child develops so does their ability to exercise their autonomy; although, there needs to be 
some way of determining how and when a child is capable of exercising autonomy. 
 
It was the intellectual and emotional maturity of the child that was crucial in the Gillick case 
in determining whether the child was able to make a decision regarding their own body, and 
whether to take contraceptives. In this regard, it was Lord Fraser who outlined five 
principles that a doctor must follow to have the protection of the law when providing 
contraception to a child under 16.  These principles have subsequently become known as 
‘Fraser guidelines’. They state: 
 
(1) that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his advice; 
(2) that he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to 
inform the parents that she is seeking contraceptive advice; (3) that she is 
very likely to begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or 
without contraceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives 
contraceptive advice or treatment her physical or mental health or both 
are likely to suffer; (5) that her best interests require him to give her 
contraceptive advice, treatment or both without the parental consent.  
           (per Lord Fraser at page 174) 
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As a result of the Gillick case, it because legally possible for a child under sixteen to consent 
to matters concerned with their own bodies, although in the first instance this was only to 
do with contraceptive matters.  
 
The Gillick case came before the courts prior to the UK ratification of the UNCRC, whilst the 
Axon case (R on the application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 
(Admin), was heard after the UK ratification of the UNCRC in November 1989 and, as it deals 
with many of the same issues of the Gillick case, allows the judgment in Gillick to be read in 
the light of the UNCRC. In the Axon case, the issue was whether a doctor is under an 
obligation to keep advice and/or treatment regarding contraception, sexually transmitted 
infections or abortion in confidence if the patient is less than sixteen years of age. In 
reaching his judgment, Justice Silber paid attention to articles 5, 12, 16 and 18 of the UNCRC. 
He noted that the UK ratification of the UNCRC ‘was significant as showing a desire to give 
children greater rights’ (at paragraph 64) and that  
 
the UNC provisions provide further support for the general movement 
towards now giving young people greater rights concerning their own 
future while reducing the supervisory rights of their parents. In the light of 
this change in the landscape of family matters, it would be wrong and not 
acceptable to retreat from Gillick and to impose greater duties on medical 
professionals to disclose information to parents of their younger patients. 
         (at paragraph 115) 
 
The judgment in the Axon case reinforced and extended that in Gillick. A child aged less 
than sixteen is able to provide consent for matters relating to their body in respect of 
contraception, sexually transmitted infections or abortion, provided that the principles 
within the Fraser guidelines were followed by the medical practitioner. 
 
Aside from the ability of a child to consent to matters relating to contraception, the Gillick 
case also provided for a child under sixteen to consent to other matters relating to their 
bodies and medical treatment. Lord Scarman stated that  
 
I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine 
whether or not their minor child below the age of sixteen will have medical 
treatment terminates if and when the chid achieves a sufficient understand 
and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed.  
 (Gillick at pages 188 – 189) 
 
This has become known as Gillick competence and it means that once the child has gained 
the required degree of competence (the sufficient understanding and intelligence referred 
to by Lord Scarman) the rights of the parents to override the child’s wishes cease.   
Heather Montgomery and Marc Cornock: Children’s Bodies 
27 
 
There has been some confusion since the judgment in the Gillick case regarding the 
difference between Fraser guidelines and Gillick competence, with some commentators 
using the terms interchangeably. However, ‘they are two different concepts: Fraser 
guidelines referring to specific guidance that must be followed by the health-care 
professional to provide specific treatment to a child; and Gillick competence referring to the 
ability of the child to give consent’ (Cornock, 2007: 142).  
 
The autonomy for children deemed to be Gillick competent has not been as forthcoming as 
many have been expected after the judgment in the Gillick case.  Firstly there is the fact that 
Gillick competence itself can be changing concept.  The determination of Gillick competence 
is undertaken by the healthcare professional who will undertake the proposed medical 
treatment.  Thus, one healthcare professional may deem a particular child to be Gillick 
competent whilst another may not.  In addition, because Gillick competence refers to the 
understanding and intelligence of the child in relation to a particular medical treatment, it is 
possible that a child can be deemed to be Gillick competent for one treatment but not seen 
as being Gillick competent for a more invasive or extensive procedure. It would appear that 
the more invasive the procedure, the higher that the bar will be set in terms of the child 
demonstrating their competence.  Thus, Gillick competence varies not only with the age and 
intellectual and emotional maturity of the child but also with the medical treatment 
involved.  
 
A further obstacle in terms of the autonomy of the child with regard to their own bodies has 
been the court’s acceptance that whilst a child may give their consent when they are Gillick 
competent, their refusal can be overridden. In the Gillick case it was only the ability of the 
child to consent that was advanced.  There is no right to refuse treatment provided by the 
Gillick judgment. This has been confirmed in various cases that have come before the courts 
concerning a child’s refusal to accept medical treatment. Lord Donaldson may be said to 
have been the first to have made the distinction between a competent child’s ability to be 
able to consent to or refuse medical treatment. Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to 
Treatment) [1992] Fam 11 CA concerned a 15 year 10 month old girl who had been 
admitted to an adolescent psychiatric unit and, according to the medical staff,  needed anti-
psychotic medication, which she refused when lucid. 
 
Lord Donaldson made three points in his judgment which can be seen as reducing a child’s 
autonomy over their body: 
 
There can be concurrent powers to consent. If more than one body or 
person has a power to consent, only a failure to, or refusal of, consent by 
all having that power will create a veto.  A "Gillick competent" child or one 
over the age of 16 will have a power to consent, but this will be concurrent 
with that of a parent or guardian. …The court in the exercise of its wardship 
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or statutory jurisdiction has power to override the decisions of a "Gillick 
competent" child as much as those of parents or guardians. 
(Re R at page 26) 
 
In Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627 this right of the court to overrule 
a refusal by a competent child was extended to those who are sixteen and in theory 
protected by Section 8(3) Family Law Reform Act 1969 which, as stated above, provides that 
those over the age of sixteen be treated as if they had attained the age of eighteen with 
regard to their right to consent over matters concerning their own bodies.  The case 
concerned a sixteen year old girl who suffered with anorexia nervosa and was refusing 
necessary treatment.  In his judgment Lord Donaldson stated that: 
 
No minor of whatever age has power by refusing consent to treatment to 
override a consent to treatment by someone who has parental 
responsibility for the minor and a fortiori a consent by the court. 
Nevertheless such a refusal is a very important consideration in making 
clinical judgments and for parents and the court in deciding whether 
themselves to give consent. Its importance increases with the age and 
maturity of the minor. 
(Re W at pages 639 – 640) 
 
In summary, as to what English law says about a child’s right to exercise control over their 
bodies: the Family Law Reform Act 1969 established the right of those sixteen and over to 
consent on their own behalf, the Gillick case made a significant step forward as it 
established that a person under the age of sixteen may consent for a specific medical 
treatment if they are deemed to be Gillick competent for that specific medical treatment. 
However, what may be termed a retrograde step, by those advocating a child’s right to 
autonomy over their bodies, was made in the cases of Re R & Re W where it was decided 
that the refusal of anyone under the age of eighteen, even if demonstrably competent, can 
be overridden by someone with parental responsibility or by the courts. 
 
 
Position in Scottish law 
 
The section above has considered the position of children in England and Wales regarding 
their legal right to exercise control over their bodies in relation to medical treatment. In 
Northern Ireland, the law adopts the same position to that of England and Wales. However, 
in Scotland there is a different approach which may be said, by those wishing to increase a 
child’s autonomy over their own bodies, to be superior to that which exists within the 
provisions of English law. 
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The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 effectively puts the common law provision of 
the Gillick case into statutory effect in Scotland. Section 2(4) states that 
  
A person under the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to consent on 
his own behalf to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment 
where, in the opinion of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he 
is capable of understanding the nature and possible consequences of the 
procedure or treatment. 
 
However, in addition to this provision there is a provision within the Children (Scotland) Act 
1995 which states that where it is necessary for a child to submit to medical examination or 
treatment and ‘the child has the capacity mentioned in said section 2(4), the examination or 
treatment shall only be carried out if the child consents’ (Section 90).  A further section of 
the Act clarifies that those acting as the child’s legal representative, such as those with 
parental reasonability, may only do so ‘where the chid is incapable of so acting or 
consenting on his own behalf’ (section 15(5)). 
 
This would appear to go considerably further than English law in that, as well as providing 
the ability to consent when deemed competent to do so, it provides that a competent 
child’s refusal cannot be overruled as is the case under English law.   
 
It is worth noting that these provisions have not been subject to testing in court and it is 
always possible that judicial interpretation may be more in line with that existing in English 
law. However, in the only case to come before the Scottish courts regarding a child’s refusal 
of treatment the judge, Sheriff McGowan made an obiter comment (one which is not legally 
binding) that supports the proposition that in Scotland, once has child has competence, they 
are able to consent or refuse medical treatment without either decision been overruled by 
anyone else. Sheriff McGowan commented that  
 
It seems to me illogical that on the one hand a person under the age of 16 
should be granted the power to decide upon medical treatment for himself 
but his parents have the right to override his decision. I am inclined to the 
view that the minor’s decision is paramount and cannot be overridden. The 
Act itself does not provide any mechanism for resolving a dispute between 
minor and guardian but it seems to me that logic demands that the minor’s 
decision is paramount. 
(Houston [1996] SCLR 943 at paragraph O) 
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In whose best interests? 
 
Even allowing for the differences between the English and Scottish legal approach to 
children’s rights to have autonomy over their own bodies, it would appear that these cases 
represent a move forward in attempts to implement children’s rights and enhance their 
legal position. However, in reading the judgments from cases that consider a child’s right to 
consent over their body, it is tempting to ask whether it is the best interests of the child that 
are being protected or advanced or those of the adults involved, such as those of the health 
care professionals? 
 
For instance, in the Re W case, Lord Donaldson stated at the end of his judgment that   
 
The effect of consent to treatment by the minor or someone else with 
authority to give it is limited to protecting the medical or dental 
practitioner from claims for damages for trespass to the person. 
(at page 640) 
 
In the Gillick case, Lord Fraser stated that he did not ‘doubt that any important medical 
treatment of a child under 16 would normally only be carried out with the parents’ 
approval’ (at page 173), thereby suggesting that consent by a child under sixteen would not 
be sufficient for certain treatments, even where the chid is assessed as being Gillick 
competent. 
 
With a different emphasis Lord Donaldson, in Re R, likens the process of obtaining consent 
to that of a lock and key. He suggests that like the fact that a lock only needs one key to 
open it, consents only require one person to provide it for it to be legally valid. Furthermore, 
if one person provides consent and another objects, legally this does not provide any 
dilemma as one consent is all that is required.  This seems to suggest that it does not matter 
at all where the ‘key’ comes from as long as one is obtained. If the only reason that those 
under the age of eighteen were being provided with a mechanism that appears to increase 
their autonomy with regard to their bodies were to protect others, it would be a very 
unsatisfactory state of affairs that totally failed to address the provisions of the UNCRC and 
the needs of children.   
 
Perhaps the issue of consent with regard to medical treatment can be best seen when one 
considers further comment from Lord Donaldson on the purpose of seeking consent. In Re 
W he stated that  
 
There seems to be some confusion in the minds of some as to the purpose 
of seeking consent from a patient (whether adult or child) or from 
someone with authority to give that consent on behalf of the patient. It has 
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two purposes, the one clinical and the other legal. The clinical purpose 
stems from the fact that in many instances the co-operation of the patient 
and the patient's faith or at least confidence in the efficacy of the 
treatment is a major factor contributing to the treatment's success. Failure 
to obtain such consent will not only deprive the patient and the medical 
staff of this advantage, but will usually make it much more difficult to 
administer the treatment. I appreciate that this purpose may not be served 
if consent is given on behalf of, rather than by, the patient. However, in the 
case of young children knowledge of the fact that the parent has consented 
may help. The legal purpose is quite different. It is to provide those 
concerned in the treatment with a defence to a criminal charge of assault 
or battery or a civil claim for damages for trespass to the person. It does 
not, however, provide them with any defence to a claim that they 
negligently advised a particular treatment or negligently carried it out.  
(at pages 633 – 634) 
 
This at least provides some reassurance as to the purpose of providing children with rights 
in relation to consenting for medical treatments. The principle is to allow children to 
participate in the decision making process even where they may not be able to fully 
participate by having complete autonomy.   The current law allows children to have some 
control and rights over their bodies whilst at the same time providing protection for those 
who treat them. Children’s rights with regard to their bodies remain a very heavily 
contested area in English law.  
 
Discussion 
 
The length and complexities of the cases discussed here suggest that there are no easy 
answers to the questions they raise. It is obvious that while everyone involved was doing 
what they perceived of as being in the child’s best interests, there was no consensus about 
what this was and how it might be best achieved. From a children’s rights perspective, the 
Gillick and Axon cases are perhaps the easiest to deal with. In many respects the actual 
children involved were peripheral to these judgements, there is no indication that either 
Mrs Gillick’s or Mrs Axon’s daughters had asked their doctors for contraception or sought 
abortions and they remained the passive subjects of the court cases rather than active 
participants. Their mothers were fighting to enshrine a principle of parental 
control/responsibility and were arguing that their own children (or indeed other people’s 
children) were not autonomous individuals who could make decisions to control their own 
bodies, and specifically, their own sexuality and reproductive health. While the Gillick case 
occurred before the UK ratified the UNCRC, it would be easy to argue that her stance went 
against the philosophy of the Convention and that its ideals of autonomy, self-
determination and justice suggest that children do have rights to bodily autonomy, even if 
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these are not specifically mentioned. By the time the Axon case came to court it can be 
argued that there was a presumption of competence unless shown otherwise and the 
principle was established that in some aspects of medical treatment, it was children, not 
parents, who could claim the right to control their bodies, as long as they were ‘Gillick 
competent’ and that their capacity to consent and their ability to understand the 
information given were sufficiently evolved. This may not have been because of the UNCRC, 
but it was certainly in line with its principles.  
 
In the cases concerning anorexia or the refusal to take anti-psychotic medicine  however the 
reverse is true and while in some respects it might appear obvious that children’s rights to 
protection must override children’s rights to have due consideration given to their views, it 
nevertheless raises troubling issues for a children’s rights agenda. It would be easy to claim 
that it is in the child’s best interest to be force-fed and that anorexia is a form of illness 
which needs invasive treatment. Furthermore, as a form of mental illness, it is arguable that 
child sufferers are by definition not mentally competent to refuse treatment. Yet as long as 
adult sufferers of anorexia are not automatically force-fed there remains a fundamental 
dichotomy between adults and children in this field which assumes that adults are 
competent unless shown not to be while children are automatically assumed to be 
incompetent unless shown otherwise. Such a stance sits uneasily alongside the idea of 
children as individuals and social actors and yet allowing children to starve themselves to 
death without intervention is equally anathema to the humane premise of the UNCRC which 
is based on protection and nurturance as well as participation. 
 
Perhaps the only workable compromise is to accept that in decisions about certain forms of 
medical care, children do not have an automatic right to participate, and that in these cases 
decisions about care or treatment need to be taken out of the hands of doctors, parents and 
indeed children themselves and settled in the courts on a case by case basis.  
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